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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial issues in uncertainty modelling and
information sciences is the relationship between probability theory and
 w x.fuzzy sets Zadeh 31 . Many probability advocates have considered fuzzy
sets as ill-interpreted probabilities combined in an ad hoc manner. Re-
lated to fuzzy sets is the theory of possibility that has been around for 15
 w x w x.years under this name Zadeh 32 , Dubois and Prade 5 but whose
w xcalculation rules go back to Shackle 23 , at least. Possibility theory can be
more directly compared to probability theory than fuzzy sets because it
also proposes set-functions that quantify the uncertainty of events. A
U w xpossibility measure on a finite set U is a mapping from 2 to 0, 1 , such
that
P B s 0, P U s 1 1 .  .  .
P A j B s Max P A , P B . 2 .  .  .  . .
w xIt is completely characterized by a possibility distribution p : U ª 0, 1
 .  .   . 4such that p a s 1 for some a g U, since P A s Max p a ¬ a g A . In
 .the infinite case the equivalence between p and P requires axiom 2 to
w xbe extended to an infinite family of subsets. Zadeh 32 views the possibil-
ity distribution p as stemming from the membership function m of aF
fuzzy set F. Hence the controversy between possibility and probability
 w x.measures is related to the one about fuzzy sets e.g., Cheeseman 3 .
Instead of pursuing sterile polemics, another attitude is to relate fuzzy
sets, possibility distributions, and probability. The history of such a rela-
tionship is already quite long and we shall only point out two existing
bridges between probability and fuzzy sets viewed as possibility distribu-
w xtions. See Dubois and Prade 12 for a more complete discussion.
A first point of view is to acknowledge a possibility measure as an upper
 .probability envelope. Namely if we consider a set of probabilities P P s
 <  .  . 4  .P P A F P A , ;A : U , then the induced upper probabilities P* A
  .  .4  .s Sup P A ¬ P g P P coincide with the possibility degrees P A . The
possibility distribution p is then defined by
 4p a s P* a , ;a g U. 3 .  . .
 .The set P P is never empty due to the normalization of the possibility
  . .distribution i.e., 'A, P A s 1 . This view is adopted in Dubois and
w xPrade 6 , for instance. More recently a characteristic condition has been
given under which a set of probability measures induced by lower bounds
of probabilities of specified events leads to possibility measures. Namely
 <  . 4  .P s P P A G a , i s 1, . . . , n s P P for some possibility measure Pi i
if the A 's are nested and any possibility measure can be represented thisi
 w x.way. Dubois and Prade 10 .
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This view of possibility measures as upper bounds of a family of
probability measures was adopted in the late seventies in a more restricted
framework, namely that of random sets and belief function theory Shafer
w x. w x w x25 . Several scholars such as Fortet and Kambouzia 13 , Orlov 20 ,
w x w x w x w xKampe de Feriet 18 , Sales 21 , Goodman 14 , Wang and Sanchez 30 ,Â Â
w xand Dubois and Prade 4 pointed out that given a random set R on U,
i.e., a set of subsets A , . . . , A g U, and a mass assignment m such that1 n
 .  x nm A s m g 0, 1 and  m s 1, then a membership function couldi i is1 i
be defined as
m u s m . 4 .  .F i
ugAi
Interpreting A as an imprecise observation, the two following seti
 w x.functions are defined in belief function theory Shafer 25
Bel A s m , Pl A s m , 5 .  .  . i i
A :A A lA/Bi i
respectively called belief and plausibility functions. These set functions
 .  .coincide with lower and upper probabilities, respectively, and 3 and 4
 .  4. w xcoincide in this setting due to p a s Pl a . Moreover Shafer 25, p. 220
 .   .  ..showed in his book that Pl A j B s Max Pl A , Pl B if and only if the
A 's are nested. Hence a possibility measure is a special case of ai
plausibility function, itself a special case of upper probability.
Another point of view is to interpret the membership function of a fuzzy
set as a likelihood function. This idea is actually quite old in fuzzy set
theory since it has been the basis of experimental methods for constructing
membership functions. Given a population of individuals and a fuzzy
concept F, each individual is asked whether a given element u g U can be
 .called an F or not. The likelihood function P 9F9 ¬ u is then obtained and
represents the proportion of individuals that answered yes to the question.
Then it is natural to let
<m u s P 9F9 u , ;u g U. 6 .  .  .F
w xThese types of Yes]No experiments have been used by Hersh et al. 16
w x w xand Hisdal 17 . Cheeseman 3 exploits this link and claims that on such
grounds fuzzy sets are nothing new. Here we suggest that this link will lead
to a cross-fertilization of fuzzy set and likelihood theories, provided that
one does not stick to a dogmatic Bayesian position.
Direct relationships between possibility distributions and likelihood
w x w xfunctions have been pointed out by Smets 26 and Thomas 27, 28 . Indeed
the likelihood function is treated as a possibility distribution in classical
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statistics for so-called likelihood ratio tests. Namely if some hypothesis of
the form u g A is to be tested against the opposite hypothesis u f A on
the basis of observation O alone, and the knowledge of elementary
 < .likelihood functions P O u , u g U, then the likelihood ratio test method-
 < .ology suggests the comparison between Max P O u and Maxug A uf A
 < .  .  .  .  < .  wP O u , i.e., P A and P A letting p u s P O u see, e.g., Barnett 1,
x. w xp. 150 . Thomas 28 also indicates that the Bayesian updating procedure
<P O u ? p u .  .
<p u O s 7 .  .
P O .
can be interpreted in terms of fuzzy observations. For instance if p
represents the base rate of the size of some population, and one learns
that the concerned individual is ``tall,'' where ``tall'' is defined by member-
ship function m , then the a posteriori probability can be computed int al l
 .accordance with 7 as
m u ? p u .  .t al l
<p u tall s , 8 .  .
P tall .
 .  .where m u is interpreted as a likelihood function, and P tall st al l
 . w x Hm dP u is Zadeh's probability of a fuzzy event 31 see also Duboist al l
w x.and Prade 8 .
 .The two probability-oriented views upper probability and likelihood of
fuzzy sets and possibility distributions are not antagonist and can be
 .reconciled. For instance 4 corresponds to another experiment for con-
structing membership functions whereby individuals are asked to point out
a single crisp subset A : U that represents some fuzzy concept F best.i
m represents the proportions of individuals for which F is best describedi
by A . If it makes sense to relate this experiment with the likelihoodi
Yes]No experiment, provided that when each individual chooses A asi
representing F it means that he would answer yes in the other experiment
to the question ``Is u an F? if and only if u g A , then as pointed out ini
w xDubois and Prade 7 .
<P 9F9 u s m . 9 .  . i
ugAi
Another way of relating the two approaches is to notice that the use of
 w x.the Dempster rule Shafer 25, pp. 57]73 to combine two belief functions,
one of which being a probability function, leads to a probability function
 .  .that is computed via 7 or 8 exactly. Namely let Bel be defined by1
POSSIBILITY THEORY AND LIKELIHOODS 363
 . 4A , m , i s 1, n and Bel s p, theni i 2
 m ? p u m u ? p u .  .  .i : ug A i Fi;u g U, Bel [ Bel s s ,1 2  m ? p u  m u ? p u .  .  .i , u : ug A i ugU Fi
10 .
 .where Bel [ Bel is a probability measure and m is defined by 4 . Only1 2 F
 .the plausibility of singletons i.e., the possibility distribution is useful for
the updating, and it plays the role of a likelihood function. The above
results suggest how to get likelihood functions from belief functions. The
w xconverse problem is addressed by Shafer 24 . In this paper it is suggested
that an observation O defines a consonant belief function whose associ-
.ated plausibility is a possibility measure with mass assignment given by
< <  4m A s P O a y P O a , A s a , . . . , a .  .  .O i i iq1 i 1 i
<m U s P O a 11 .  . .O n
m A s 0 otherwise, .O
 4  < .  < .where U s a , . . . , a with P O a G ??? G P O a . This is a non-nec-1 n 1 n
 < . essarily normalized mass assignment. However, if P O a s 1 p is then1
.  .  < .normalized , and letting p a s P O a then this procedure is exactly the
 . w xconverse of Eq. 4 , as already proposed in Dubois and Prade 4 .
Another way of putting together the upper probability approach and the
likelihood approach to possibility theory is to consider a family of likeli-
hood functions and to define a possibility as the upper envelope of this
family.
More concretely we shall consider that the possibility distribution not
.necessarily normalized associated with an observation O is
<p a s Sup P O a , 12 .  .  .
PgP
where P is a set of possible probability distributions and it is assumed that
this set P cannot specify anything about the a priori probabilities in U.
That is, P can only give information about conditional probabilities of the
observations given the true value from U. The result will be that a
possibility distribution will be an upper bound of the possible likelihood
functions.
The main contributions of this paper will be to justify the calculus of
P A s Sup p a 13 .  .  .
agA
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as an exact value, not as an approximation. Note that we will have
<P A s Sup Sup P O a ¬ P g P 14 .  .  . 5
agA
which should not be confused with the first view we mentioned where
P A s Sup P A ¬ P g P P . 15 4 .  .  .  .
Besides, this framework will also enable us to consider the possibility
distribution,
<p 9 a s Inf P O a 16 .  .  .
PgP
in association with the set function
D A s Inf p 9 a , 17 .  .  .
agA
where D estimates the so-called guaranteed possibility of A with respect
 w x.to p 9 Dubois and Prade 11 . Guaranteed possibility plays the same role
  .with respect to possibility measures as commonality functions Q A s
.  . m with respect to plausibility functions. It pessimistically esti-A = A ii
mates the ``feasibility'' of A. The characteristic property of the guaranteed
possibilities is
;A , B , D A j B s Min D A , D B . 18 .  .  .  . .
 .  .  . By convention D B s 1, and D U s 0 if Inf p 9 u s 0 anti-nor-ugU
.malization of p 9 .
Moreover, we shall study the problem of combination justifying the use
of the Min rule, as an exact procedure when no additional information is
available. Usually the Min rule is justified in the literature under mutual
dependence or coherence of observations.
2. POSSIBILITY MEASURES
 .If U is a set finite or infinite , we define a possibility measure in U as a
U w xmapping P: 2 ª 0, 1 satisfying
 .  .1 P B s 0
 .  .2 P U s 1
 .  .   .  .43 ;A, B : U, P A j B s Max P A , P B .
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U w x  .  .A mapping P: 2 ª 0, 1 satisfying properties 1 and 3 is called a
 .non-normalized possibility measure. Although property 2 is not enforced,
P verifies the following property:
 .  .29 0 - P U F 1.
In this paper, we shall deal with non-normalized measures mainly.
w xAccording to Zadeh 32 , this normalization is not compulsory.
A normalized possibility measure on U can be defined from a possibility
distribution p on U, that is, a mapping
w xp : U ª 0, 1 19 .
such that
Sup p u ¬ u g U s 1. 20 4 .  .
The possibility measure in U is defined by
P A s Sup p u ¬ u g A . 21 4 .  .  .
 .For a non-normalized measure condition 20 is not always verified and,
in general, we have
Sup p u ¬ u g U F 1. 22 4 .  .
Given a possibility measure in U, its associated possibility distribution is
defined by
 4p u s P u . 23 .  . .
However, in general, on infinite sets a possibility measure is not always
defined by its possibility distribution. As an example, consider in the set of
reals the possibility measure assigning a value of 0 to the finite sets and a
value of 1 to the infinite sets. The associated possibility distribution is
 .always 0, and condition 21 cannot be verified. To ensure that a possibility
measure can be defined by its possibility distribution, we need to change
 .property 3 into a stronger property:
 .  4  .39 ; A , where A : U ; i g I, we have P D A si ig I i ig I i
  . 4Sup P A ¬ i g I .i
In this paper we shall see that a non-normalized possibility measure
 .verifying property 39 can be recovered from its possibility distribution
 .through Eq. 21 .
We shall assume that there is a finite set of elementary observations,
 4O s c , . . . , c . In general, an observation will be a subset O : O. Each1 n
observation will define a possibility measure.
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Before going on we need some definitions about imprecise probabilities
 w x.see 2 for a deeper study in the finite case.
If we have two arbitrary sets, U , U , an a priori imprecise probabilistic1 2
information on U will be a convex set P of probability measures defined1 1
 U1. 1on U , 2 .1
 Ui.If I is the set of all the possible probability measures on U , 2 , ai i
conditional probability on U given U will be a mapping,2 1
P : U ª I . 24 .2 <1 1 2
 .  < .If a g U and A : U , P a is usually denoted by P ? a , and1 2 2 <1 2 <1
 . .  < .P a A by P A a .2 <1 2 <1
A conditional imprecise probabilistic information will be a convex set
P of conditional probabilities on U given U .2 <1 2 1
 U1.Given an a priori piece of information on U , 2 , P , and a condi-1 1
tional piece of information on U given U , P , we can build a bidimen-2 1 2 <1
sional probability on U = U , given by the convex set of probabilities,1 2
P s CH P = P ¬ P g P , P g P , 25 4  . .12 1 2 <1 1 1 2 <1 2 <1
where CH stands for the convex hull operator and
U1=U 2 <;A g 2 , P = P A s P A a dP a , 26 .  .  . .H1 2 <1 2 <1 a 1
U1
  . 4where A s b g U ¬ a, b g A .a 2
Given P s P = P defined on U = U , A g 2U1, A g 2U2 , we12 1 2 <1 1 2 1 2
have the equalities
< <P A u s P A u 27 . .  .12 2 1 2 <1 2 1
 .for all the elements u g U y N, where N is a set with P N s 0.1 1 1
This equality is a consequence of the definition of conditional probabil-
w x  .ity in the general case 19, pp. 370]384 and equality 26 . One has
<P A = U s P U a dP a s P A 28 .  .  .  . .H12 1 2 2 <1 2 1 1 1
A1
1 There is no necessity of defining probabilities on a s-algebra of measurable sets, because
 .from a probability distribution on U, A , where A is a s-algebra we can define a convex set
 U . w xof probabilities on U, 2 29, pp. 120]126 . This convex set is determined by the inner and
w xouter associated measures 15, pp. 51, 58 .
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since
U if a g A2 1A s b g U ¬ a, b g A = U s 4 .a 2 1 2  B otherwise;
and
P A = A 1 .12 1 2
< <P A A s s P A a dP a 29 .  . .  .H12 2 1 2 <1 2 1P A = U P A .  . A12 1 2 1 1 1
since
A if a g A2 1A s b g U ¬ a, b g A = A s 4 .a 2 1 2  B otherwise.
In this paper these concepts will be applied to the case in which U s U1
and U s O, where O is a set of possible elementary observations and U is2
a space of interest, i.e., through the observations made in O, we hope to
determine what is the true value of a variable X ranging on U. An
observation will be a set of elementary observations. That is, a subset from
O. The meaning of an observation, O, is that some of the elementary
observations belonging to it has been given, but we do not know which. For
example, let us assume that we have balls in an urn with colors red, white,
and blue, and that we pick up a ball from the urn and observe the color. In
 4  4this case O s red, white, blue . A subset O s red, white , represents that
we have observed that the color of the ball is not blue. It can be red or
white.
As U is finite a probability measure can be given by means of its2
probability distribution, always denoted by the same symbol in lowercase.
The type of probabilistic information giving rise to a possibility on U will
be a convex set of probability measure P defined on the set U = O, such
that it can be expressed in the following way,
P s I = P s P = P ¬ P g I , P g P . 30 4  .1 2 <1 1 2 <1 1 1 2 <1 2 <1
That is, it is equal to the combination of a conditional piece of informa-
tion with the a priori I , which is equal to all the possible probability1
measures on U. This combination does not say anything a priori about the
true value in U. It only relates2 the true value on U with observations from
a set O. A possibility measure on U will be determined when an observa-
tion from O is selected.
2 The conditional information is the only one that is meaningful of the two combined
pieces of information.
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Since I is the set of all the probability measures on U, we do not need1
 .to apply the convex hull operator in expression 30 as was done in
 . Xexpression 25 . In effect, it can be easily proved that if there exists P 2 <1
 X 4.such that P s CH P = P ¬ P g P , P g P then we can find a1 2 <1 1 1 2 <1 2 <1
 .P such that 30 is verified.2 <1
The following theorem gives the exact formulation of our semantics of
 .non-normalized possibility measures with property 39 .
U w xTHEOREM 1. Gi¨ en a set U, a mapping P: 2 ª 0, 1 is a non-neces-
 .sarily normalized possibility measure on U ¨erifying 39 , if and only if there
 .exists a triplet O, P, O where
}O is a finite set of elementary obser¨ ations,
}P is a con¨ex set of probability measures defined on U = O which can
be expressed as,
P s I = P , 31 .1 2 <1
where P is a con¨ex set of conditional probabilities and I is the set of all2 <1 1
probability measures on U,
}O is an obser¨ ation: O : O,
and such that
<P A s Sup P O A ¬ P g P , 32 4 .  .  .
 .  < .where if P A s 0, then P O A is not considered in the supremum and the
supremum of the empty set is equal to 0.
 . U w xProof. Assume a triplet O, P, O and P a mapping from 2 into 0, 1
 .verifying 32 . We are going to show that, in this case, P is a possibility
 .measure verifying 39 .
w xLet p : U ª 0, 1 defined by
<p a s Sup P O a ¬ P g P . 33 4 .  .  .
First we are going to prove the equality
<Sup P O A ¬ P g P s Sup p a ¬ a g A . 34 4 4 .  .  .
 .To do this, consider a g A and P g P. According to 31 we have0
P s P = P , 35 .1 2 <1
where P g I , P g P .1 1 2 <1 2 <1
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Let P9 be the probability in U = O defined by
P9 s P = P , 36 .a 2 <10
  .where P is the probability measure degenerated in a P B s 1 if anda 0 a0 0
.only if a g B and is equal to 0 otherwise and P is in P .0 2 <1 2 <1
We have that P9 g P, because I is the family of all the probabilities in1
U, and
1
< < <P9 O A s P O a dP a s P O a . 37 .  .  .  . .H 2 <1 a 2 <1 00P A . Aa0
What we have shown is that ;a g A, P g P, there exists P9 g P such0
that
< <P O a s P9 O A . 38 .  . .0
Therefore, we have
< <;a g A , Sup P O a ¬ P g P F Sup P O A ¬ P g P . 39 4 4  .  . .0 0
That is,
<;a g A , p a F Sup P O A ¬ P g P 40 4 .  .  .0 0
and
<Sup p a ¬ a g A F Sup P O A ¬ P g P . 41 4  4 .  .  .
 .On the other hand, taking into account 29 , for every P g P we have
1
< <P O A s P O a dP a , 42 .  .  .  .H 2 <1 1P A . A1
where P g I and P g P .1 1 2 <1 2 <1
Taking into account the properties of the integral,
1
< < <P O A s P O a dP a F Sup P O a ¬ a g A . 43 .  .  .  .  . 4H 2 <1 1 2 <1P A . A1
That is, for every P g P there is a conditional probability P g P2 <1 2 <1
such that
< <P O A F Sup P O a ¬ a g A . 44 .  .  . 42 <1
Taking supremum in P g P , we have that for every P g P2 <1 2 <1
< <P O A F Sup Sup P O a ¬ a g A . 45 .  .  . 42 <1
P gP2 <1 2 <1
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Now, taking supremum in P g P, we have
< <Sup P O A F Sup Sup P O a ¬ a g A .  . 42 <1
PgP P gP2 <1 2 <1
<s Sup Sup P O a ¬ a g A s Sup p a ¬ a g A . 4 .  .2 <1 5
P gP2 <1 2 <1
46 .
 .  .  .  .This inequality together with 41 proves 34 . Now from 32 and 34
we have
P A s Sup p a ¬ a g A . 47 4 .  .  .
 .  .  . Properties 1 , 29 , and 39 are immediate from this equation p is the
.possibility distribution associated to P .
 .Only If Assume a non-necessarily normalized possibility measure P
 .on U, verifying 39 . Let p be its associated possibility distribution. In
 4  4these conditions we consider O s c , c , O s c , and P the set of1 2 1
probabilities
P s I = P ,1 2 <1
where
<P s P ¬ P O a F p a , a g U . 48 .  .  . 42 <1 2 <1 2 <1
In these conditions, it is immediate that
<p a s Sup P O a ¬ P g P . 49 4 .  .  .
 .In the proof of the If part we have shown that from this equality
  ..   ..Eq. 33 and given P s I = P we can deduce Eq. 341 2 <1
<Sup P O A ¬ P g P s Sup p a ¬ a g A . 4 4 .  .
 .  .This equality together with 47 gives the desired result, 32 .
 .  .  .Putting together 32 , 33 , and 34 , what has really been obtained is
that
< <P A s Sup P O A ¬ P g P s Sup P O a ¬ a g A , P g P . 51 4  4 .  .  .  .
 .In other words P A is the upper bound of the likelihood function
 < .   < . 4P O A when only the likelihoods P O a ¬ a g A, P g P are available.
This result is not surprising. Indeed, consider the case when P contains a
 < .single element P O ? and A is finite. Then Theorem 1 claims that
< <P O A F Max P O a ¬ a g A . 52 4 .  .  .
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The above inequality is obvious noticing that
< <P O A ? P A s P O a ? p a . 53 .  .  .  .  .
agA
 < .   < . 4Hence P O A is always a convex sum of P O a ¬ a g A , hence
smaller than the maximum among these elementary likelihoods. The
calculus of possibility theory is thus closely related to the maximum
likelihood principle.
 .The equality 53 leads us as well to the inequality
< <Inf P O a ¬ a g A F P O A . 54 4 .  .  .
More generally, an analogue of Theorem 1 can be established for the
definition of guaranteed possibility function D in terms of a set of
likelihood functions. Namely,
< <D A s Inf P O A s Inf Inf P O a .  .  .
agAPgP PgP
<s Inf Inf P O a s Inf p 9 a 55 .  .  .
agA agAPgP
with
<p 9 a s Inf P O a 56 .  .  .
PgP
 3.where p 9 is not necessarily anti-normalized . Note that p 9 F p , where p
 .is defined by 33 .
  .  ..Thus, in this framework, the pair D A , P A is interpreted as the
minimum and the maximum of the probabilities to get the observation O
given that we are in A, over a convex set of probabilities. This clearly
estimates the plausibility to be in A when O is observed from an abductive
reasoning point of view, that is, when the aim is to find a set of hypotheses
explaining the current observations.
3. COMBINATION OF POSSIBILITY MEASURES
Before deducing the combination formulas we give some previously
known concepts and results.
DEFINITION 1. If P is a non-normalized possibility measure on U, we
 .  . .say that P satisfies the triplet O, P, O O, P, O * P if and only if
<P A G Sup P O A ¬ P g P . 57 4 .  .  .
3  .Remember that p 9 is anti-normalized when Inf p 9 u s 0.ug U
DUBOIS, MORAL, AND PRADE372
Following this definition we can say that the possibility measure associ-
 .ated with a triplet according to Theorem 1 is the most specific of all the
possibility measures satisfying it.
The definition of consequence for two possibility measures is immediate.
DEFINITION 2. If P and P9 are possibility measures on U we say that
 .  .P9 is a consequence of P P * P9 if and only if every triplet O, P, O
verified by P is also verified by P9.
 .  .It is immediate that this definition is equivalent to P A F P9 A ,
U ;A g 2 that is, the possibility P is more informative than P9, according
w x.to Zadeh 32 .
This definition can be expressed in terms of possibility distributions as it
is done in the following theorem.
 .THEOREM 2. If P is a possibility measure on U and O, P, O is a triplet,
then P ¨erifies the triplet if and only if
<p a G Sup P O a ¬ P g P , 58 4 .  .  .
where p is the possibility distribution associated with P.
Proof. We give only a sketch of the proof. We have to show given a
 .triplet O, P, O , that
< UP A G P O A , ;P g P , ;A g 2 59 .  .  .
if and only if,
<P A G P O a , ;P g P , ;a g A. 60 .  .  .
 .  .The If part is based on 21 and the inequality
< <Sup P O a ¬ a g A G P O A , ;P g P. 61 4 .  .  .
 .The Only If part is based on the fact that P s I = P , then1 2 <1
U   .  .;P g P, ;A g 2 , ;a g A, we can find see Eqs. 35 to 38 in the proof
.of Theorem 1 a probability P9 in P such that
< <P9 O A s P O a . 62 .  .  .
3.1. Conjuncti¨ e Rules
For the possibility measure induced by two measures, P and P , we1 2
consider the case in which P and P come from two different observa-1 2
tions, O and O . The induced possibility has to be associated with the1 2
intersection of the observations, O l O . We could obtain the same1 2
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result considering that the two possibility measures satisfy the same triplet
and therefore the same observation, but we think that this is a more
general and realistic case.
DEFINITION 3. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U, we say1 2
 .that P is a consequence of P and P P , P * P if and only if for1 2 1 2
 .  .every pair of triplets O, P, O and O, P, O satisfied by P and P ,1 2 1 2
 .respectively, the triplet O, P, O l O is satisfied by P.1 2
The following theorem justifies the use of the minimum rule applied to
the possibility distributions to calculate a consequence of two possibility
measures, P and P .1 2
THEOREM 3. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U and p , p ,1 2 1
and p are their possibility distributions, then P , P * P if and only if2 1 2
p a G Min p a , p a , ;a g U. 63 4 .  .  .  .1 2
 .  .  .Proof. If If O, P, O and O, P, O are two triplets verified by P1 2 1
and P then by Theorem 2,2
<p a G Sup P O a ¬ P g P , i s 1, 2. 64 4 .  . .i i
 .   .  .4If p a G Min p a , p a , ;a g U, then as1 2
P O l O ¬ a F P O ¬ a , i s 1, 2 65 .  .  .1 2 i
we have
p a G Sup P O l O ¬ a ¬ P g P , 66 4 .  .  .1 2
 .that is, P verifies O, P, O l O .1 2
 .  4  4  4Only If Consider O s c , c , c , O s c , c , O s c , c , and1 2 3 1 1 2 2 2 3
< <P s P ¬ P O a F p a , P O a F p a 67 .  .  . 4 .  .2 <1 2 <1 2 <1 1 1 2 <1 2 2
P s I = P . 68 .1 2 <1
 .  .Evidently, the triplets O, P, O and O, P, O are verified by P and1 2 1
 .P , respectively. Then O, P, O l O is verified by P. That is,2 1 2
<p a G Sup P O l O a ¬ P g P . 69 4 .  . .1 2
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Now, let us calculate the value of the right part of this inequality,
< <Sup P O l O a ¬ P g P s Sup P O l O a ¬ P g P 4  4 .  .1 2 2 <1 1 2 2 <1 2 <1
< <s Sup P O l O a ¬ P O a F p a , .  .  .2 <1 1 2 2 <1 1 1
<P O a F p a . 70 .  .4 .2 <1 2 2
To calculate this supremum, we only have to calculate
Sup P A l A ¬ P A F p , P A F p , 71 4 .  .  .  .1 2 1 1 2 2
<  .where A s O a, p s p a . Doing simple calculations with elementaryi i i i
 4probability theory it is easy to prove that this supremum is Min p , p ,1 2
  .  .4  .that is, Min p a , p a . As this is the value of the right part of 69 , we1 2
get the desired inequality.
p a G Min p a , p a . 4 .  .  .1 2
If p and p are two possibility distributions, then p n p s1 2 1 2
 4Min p , p is the most specific distribution entailed by p , p . This1 2 1 2
distribution is characterized by
 .  41 p , p * Min p , p1 2 1 2
 .  42 If p , p * p then Min p , p * p .1 2 1 2
This justifies the use of the Min rule to combine two possibility distribu-
tions: it is the most specific knowledge that is a consequence of both
distributions. It is important to remark that no specific knowledge is
required about the relationships between the observations O and O1 2
defining the combined possibility measures. The minimum rule can be
applied in the general case. It is not a particular case when we know that
 .O and O are coherent one of them implies the other .1 2
Another important observation is that, in general, the possibility mea-
 4sure associated with Min p , p is not the minimum of the possibility1 2
 4measures Min P , P . The minimum of the possibility measures is in1 2
general greater than or equal to that of the measure associated with the
minimum of the possibility distributions. This result is to be considered in
w xconnection with another one by Dubois and Prade 9 , namely that the only
way of aggregating possibility measures so as to get another possibility
measure via a direct combination of the possibilities of each event is by
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using the maximum of the possibility degrees possibly transformed by
.monotonically increasing functions , i.e.,
;A , P A s Max f P A , f P A 72 .  .  .  . .  . .1 2
 .  .   .with f 0 s f 0 s 0, f and f monotonically increasing, and Max f 1 ,1 2 1 2 1
 .. w xf 1 s 1 9 .2
Other rules can be justified when specific knowledge is available about
the relationships between the observations. The following definitions and
theorems are given for these special conditions. The first is given for the
combination of independent possibility measures.
DEFINITION 4. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U, we say1 2
that P is a consequence of the independent measures P and P1 2
 .  .P n P * P if and only if for every pair of triplets O, P, O and1 i 2 1
 .O, P, O satisfied by P and P , respectively, with2 1 2
< < <P O l O u s P O u ? P O u , ;u g U, ;P g P , 73 . .  .  .1 2 1 2
 .the triplet O, P, O l O is satisfied by P.1 2
The theorem justifies the use of the product rule.
THEOREM 4. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U and p , p ,1 2 1
and p are their possibility distributions, then P n P * P if and only if2 1 i 2
p a G p a ? p a , ;a g U. 74 .  .  .  .1 2
 .Proof. The proof is immediate from equality 73 .
DEFINITION 5. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U, we say1 2
that P is a consequence of the mutually exclusive measures P and P1 2
 .  .P n P * P if and only if for every pair of triplets O, P, O and1 m e 2 1
 .O, P, O satisfied by P and P , respectively, with2 1 2
< < <P O l O u s Max 0, P O u q P O u y 1 , ;u g U, ;P g P 4 .  .  .1 2 1 2
75 .
 .the triplet O, P, O l O is satisfied by P.1 2
 .Condition 75 expresses that given the true value u g U, then the
probability of the intersection of the observations is minimum.
THEOREM 5. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U and p , p ,1 2 1
and p are their possibility distributions, then P n P * P if and only if2 1 m e 2
p a G Max 0, p a q p a y 1 , ;a g U. 76 4 .  .  .  .1 2
 .Proof. The proof is immediate from equality 75 .
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3.2. Disjuncti¨ e Rules
Disjunctive rules will be applied to the combination of two possibility
measures coming from two observations when we know that one of the
observations is true but we do not know which one is true. We start with
the deduction of a general rule, under no special conditions.
DEFINITION 6. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U, we say1 2
that P is a consequence of the disjunction of measures P and P1 2
 .  .P k P * P if and only if for every pair of triplets O, P, O and1 2 1
 .  .O, P, O satisfied by P and P , respectively, the triplet O, P, O j O2 1 2 1 2
is satisfied by P.
THEOREM 6. If P, P , and P are possibility measures on U and p , p ,1 2 1
and p are their possibility distributions, then P k P * P if and only if2 1 2
p a G Min 1, p a q p a , ;a g U. 77 4 .  .  .  .1 2
 .  .  .Proof. If If O, P, O and O, P, O are two triplets verified by P1 2 1
and P then by Theorem 2,2
<p a G Sup P O a ¬ P g P , i s 1, 2. 78 4 .  . .i i
 .   .  .4If p a G Min 1, p a q p a , ;a g U, then as1 2
< < <P O j O a F Min 1, P O a q P O a 79 4  . .  .  .1 2 1 2
we have
<p a G Sup P O j O a ¬ P g P , 80 4 .  . .1 2
 .that is, P verifies O, P, O j O .1 2
 .  4  4  4Only If Consider O s c , c , c , O s c , c , O s c , c , and1 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 3
< <P s P ¬ P O a F p a , P O a F p a 81 .  .  . 4 .  .2 <1 2 <1 2 <1 1 1 2 <1 2 2
P s I = P . 82 .1 2 <1
 .  .Evidently, the triplets O, P, O and O, P, O are verified by P and1 2 1
 .P , respectively. Then O, P, O j O is verified by P. That is,2 1 2
<p a G Sup P O j O a ¬ P g P . 83 4 .  . .1 2
Now, let us calculate the value of the right part of this inequality,
< <Sup P O j O a ¬ P g P s Sup P O j O a ¬ P g P 4  4 .  .1 2 2 <1 1 2 2 <1 2 <1
< <s Sup P O jO a ¬ P O a Fp a , .  .  .2 <1 1 2 2 <1 1 1
<P O a F p a . 84 .  .4 .2 <1 2 2
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To calculate this supremum, we only have to calculate
Sup P A j A ¬ P A F p , P A F p , 85 4 .  .  .  .1 2 1 1 2 2
<  .where A s O a, p s p a . Doing simple calculations with elementaryi i i i
 4probability theory, it is easy to prove that this supremum is Min 1, p q p ,1 2
  .  .4  .that is, Min 1, p a q p a . As this is the value of the right part of 83 ,1 2
we get the desired inequality.
It is important to remark that the general rule for disjunctive combina-
tion is not the dual t-conorm of the minimum.4 It is the rule corresponding
to the mutually exclusive model. The reason is that the general rule goes
to the greatest value for the combination and this is obtained in the
mutually exclusive model. Other rules can be obtained under special
conditions:
v  .Independence model. Under condition 73 we get
P k P * P m p a G p a q p a y p a ? p a . 86 .  .  .  .  .  .1 i 2 1 2 1 2
v Mutual dependence model. Under the condition
< < <P O j O a s Max P O a , P O a 87 4  . .  .  .1 2 1 2
we get
P k P * P m p a G Max p a , p a . 88 4 .  .  .  .1 m d 2 1 2
3.3. Negation
The negation has a more difficult justification in our framework. Ac-
cording to our methodology if a possibility P is associated with an
observation O the negation of it, !P should be associated with the
complementary of the observation, O. However, the possibility is an upper
bound:
<P A s Sup P O A ¬ P g P . 89 4 .  .  .
 .Knowing only the value P A and not P, what is the upper bound that
  < . 4can be deduced for P O A ¬ P g P ? The answer is only the trivial
one: 1. Indeed, if we follow a method analogous to the case of the
conjunctive and disjunctive rules, then we should consider all the triplets
satisfied by P and try to find an upper bound for the probabilities
  < .4P O A . This upper bound is given by the possibility assigning 1 to every
event, A.
4 w xA t-conorm, H , is an associative, commutative, nondecreasing binary operation on 0, 1
w xverifying a H 0 s a, ;a g 0, 1 . A t-norm, H9, verifies the same properties except that
w xa H91 s a, ;a g 0, 1 . A t-conorm, H , and a t-norm H9 are dual when x H y s 1 y
 .  .. w x1 y x H9 1 y y . See 22, pp. 65]75 for more details.
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We can obtain more precise results for the negation of a possibility
measure if we add some hypothesis about the set P. For example, when
we know that the set of possible probability measures, P in U = O is
given by I = P , but there is only one probability measure in P :1 2 <1 2 <1
 4P s P . In this case the conditional relationship between the observa-2 <1 2 <1
tion and the value from U is perfectly known and the supremum for
  < . 4P O A ¬ P g P can be calculated. Let !P be the possibility measure
associated to observation O. If !p is the possibility associated with !P,
then we have
!p a s 1 y p a , ;a g U. 90 .  .  .
The situation changes if instead of having a possibility measure, what we
  .  ..have is the pair D A , P A : the minimum and the maximum of the
probabilities to get the observation O given that we are in A, over a
 .convex set of probabilities. In this case the negation of D, P , will be the
pair associated with O, the complement of the observation. As
<D A s Inf P O A ¬ P g P 91 4 .  .  .
 .  .then if ! D, P is the negation of D, P , we have that
! D , P s !D , !P s 1 y P , 1 y D , 92 .  .  .  .
where !D s 1 y P and !P s 1 y D are associated with observation O,
and are respectively the guaranteed possibility function defined from !p
  ..and the possibility measure defined from 1 y p 9 p 9 given by 56 .
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have given a semantical justification of the calculus associated with
possibility measures and distributions, in terms of upper and lower proba-
bilities.
Two important consequences of this relationship can be laid bare:
 .1 Possibility measures are appropriate when there is no a priori
information about the true value of the hypotheses. We only have some
conditional information relating each hypothesis to the corresponding
observations. For example, with no a priori information about the proba-
bility of a set of diseases, a symptom induces a possibility measure on this
set, which coincides with the likelihood function.
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 .2 Possibility measures can be combined without knowing the rela-
tionships between the observations underlying them. For example, we do
not have to know whether the observations are independent or disjoint.
This is a clear advantage over other more demanding reasoning systems, as
the Bayesian one, in which to combine the information coming from two
pieces of evidence we have to assume or to know some relationship
between the pieces of evidence in order to determine the appropriate
combination. Other rules can be applied when these relationships are
known.
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